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NOTES
lest it defeat its purposes. To discourage any attempt to defraud,
it must be made clear from the outset that any compensation plan
merely attempts to restore the victim to his former status-and
nothing more.
It must be added that any tribunal established for maximum
flexibility in the processing of a victim's claim should be carefully
and simply constituted. The discretionary exercise of judgment
would be impossible if a claim were routed through several levels
of bureaucratic formality. At the outset, therefore, minor losses
should be excluded from its purview, perhaps by establishing some
reasonably minimal jurisdictional predicate comparable to the British
three-week salary requirement.
Conclusion
The victim of a crime should be restored to his pre-crime status.
The legal institutions presently in effect have failed in the great
majority of cases to provide a means to effect such a restoration.
This writer, therefore, advocates the adoption, on a state by state
basis, of experimental systems of compensation for victims of criminal
violence. If compensating authority is vested in tribunals with
broad discretion, and if compensation is limited to the consequences
of personal injury due to violent crimes, the major practical objec-
tions to such plans can be overcome. The material and psychological
benefits which such plans would confer on the wronged victims are
justification enough for their adoption.
)X
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN NEW YoRK CRIMINAL
INSANITY STATUTES
Introduction
Insanity has been a defense to prosecution for murder since
the fourteenth century when the judiciary recognized that an in-
sane defendant was not responsible for his actions because he lacked
the mental capacity to formulate the vicious criminal intent which
justified punishment." Since that time the law has not kept pace
I PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 738-40 (1957). For a concise history of the
insanity defense see Judge Cardozo's opinion in People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y.
324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915).
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with modern sociological and psychiatric developments concerning
the criminally insane.2  Consequently, the law in most jurisdic-
tions has remained substantially the same since 1843,3 when the
M'Naghten Rule was formulated.4  New York, however, has re-
cently enacted legislation in order to remedy some of the major
defects in the M'Naghten Rule. This paper will attempt to pro-
vide an insight into this legislation by exploring the background
of the new law as well as the terminology which it employs.
Early Development of New York Law
As early as 1816, New York courts had declared a defendant
legally sane if he had knowledge of right and wrong in relation to
his specific act.5 The English M'Naghten Rule, which incorporated
this right-wrong test, was subsequently enacted into law. Thus,
Section 1120 of the New York Penal Law provided:
a person is not excused from criminal liability . . . except upon proof
that, at the time of committing the alleged criminal act, he was laboring
under such a defect of reason as:
1. Not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or,
2. Not to know that the act was wrong.6
This statute demanded a complete impairment or disintegra-
tion of the intellectual faculties before a criminal defendant could
be declared legally insane.7 It resulted in the absurdity that even if
the defendant had only partial knowledge of both the nature and
quality of his act and of its wrongfulness, he was deemed to be in
control of his behavior and to possess the requisite mens rea for a
criminal act."
By the adoption of Section 34 of the New York Penal Law,9
the legislature refused to recognize as criminally insane one who
2 See WmornOrN, MENTAL DisoRDER As A CRIMINAL Dm'EsE 2 (1954).
8E.g., State v. Andrews, 187 Kan. 458, 466-69, 357 P.2d 739, 744-47,
cert, denied, 368 U.S. 868 (1961); State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 67-72, 152
A.2d 50, 64-68 (1959) ; State v. White, 60 Wash. 2d 551, 585-93, 374 P.2d
942, 959-66, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 883 (1963).
4 M'Naghten's Case, 10 C. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
5 For a discussion of early New York decisions see GLuECE, MENTAL
DisoaRD AND THE CRImiNAL LAW 154-55 (1925).
I N.Y. Sess. Laws 1882, ch. 384, § 1. The necessity of requiring
knowledge of both nature and quality was set forth in People v. Kelly, 302
N.Y. 512, 99 N.E.2d 552 (1951).
7 See Guttnacher, The Psychiatrist As An Expert Witness, 22 U. CHr.
L. REv. 325, 326 (1955) ; Comment, 26 ALmANY L. REv. 305, 306-08 (1962).
8 See Hall, Psychiatry And The Law--A Dual Review, 38 IowA L. PRn.
687, 696 (1953) ; Reik, The Dooe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration
In The Jurisprudence Of Mental Disease, 63 YALE L.J. 183, 184 (1953).
9 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1881, ch. 676.
[ VOL. 40
suffered from a morbid propensity to commit prohibited acts with
knowledge of their wrongfulness. Hence, it affirmatively rejected
any insanity defense wherein the accused claimed that, although he
knew the nature and quality of his act and that it was wrongful,
he was under an irresistible impulse which compelled him to com-
mit the act.10
Although the New York statutes remained in effect for many
years, the harshness of such laws was readily apparent in many
decisions of the New York Court of Appeals. Thus, in People v.
Moran 1 the Court, in a per curiam decision, stated:
the defendant is a "psychopathic inferior," a man of low and unstable
mentality. ... It is the law of New York, made binding upon the court
by the enactment of a statute, that a youth of that order of mentality
should suffer the penalty of death if guilty of the crime of murder.12
The court could not base its decision on the totality of the
defendant's symptoms 13 but only upon his intellectual capabilities.
Consequently, it was found that the youth did not lack total in-
tellectual knowledge concerning the nature, quality and wrongful-
ness of his act; he was sentenced to execution.
Defects implicit in the M'Naghten Rule became especially ap-
parent in the landmark case of People v. Horton.14 The facts, in
conjunction with the Court's decision, gave impetus to a proposed
revision of the Penal Law.' 5 In that case the defendant, an adoles-
cent, was indicted for killing his father. In spite of the elicited
facts supplemented by psychiatric evidence indicating the probability
of mental disease,'6 the jury convicted the defendant of first degree
murder. This conviction was based upon the defendant's conduct
in planning and executing his father's murder. His deliberate acts
indicated a sufficient degree of intellectual cognizance for him to be
regarded as sane.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the verdict, stated "the
defendant cannot be excused from criminal liability because at the
lo .g., People v. Carpenter, 102 N.Y. 238, 6 N.E. 584 (1886); Flanagan
v. People, 52 N.Y. 467 (1873). See also Roche, Criminality And Mental
Illness-Tuwo Faces Of The Same Coin, 22 U. CHL L. REv. 320, 321
(1955); Keedy, Insanity And Criminal Responsibility, 30 HARv. L. REV.
535, 546-48 (1917).
11249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928).
12 Id. at 180, 163 N.E. at 553.
13 People v. Moran, 249 N.Y. 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928).
"4 308 N.Y. 1, 123 N.E.2d 609 (1954).
15 Gutman, People v. Horton: 'Is The M'Naghten Rule AdequatS, 7
N.Y.L.F. 320 (1961).
16 People v. Horton, 308 N.Y. 1, 17, 123 N.E.2d 609, 617 (1954) (dis-
senting opinion). See Gutman, stpra note 15, at 325.
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time of the killing his mind may have been disordered to a degree
less than that which is fixed by Section 1120 of the Penal Law." 'T
The dissent vigorously attacked the Court for refusing to in-
terpret the word "know" in the statute to include severe emotional
disturbances which would affect the defendant's ability to under-
stand that his act was wrongful.18 Under such a construction, the
defendant would have been considered insane because emotional
disturbance had permeated his "inner consciousness" to such an
extent that killing his father had been a reasonable act according to
his judgment. 9
In addition, the dissent thought that competent psychiatric
testimony was being hindered by the Court's adherence to the orig-
inal interpretation of the M'Naghten Rule. Any such testimony
had to be limited to an examination of defendant's cognitive
abilities 20 and the absence of emotional and volitional control was
considered irrelevant. Consequently, the psychiatrist was forced
to concentrate his attentions on only one aspect of the mentality of
the accused.
The Proposed Solution
The aftermath of the Horton decision resulted in Governor
Harriman's authorization of committees to study New York laws
pertaining to insanity.2' Before any constructive steps were taken,
however, People v. Wood 22 was decided. The Court of Appeals, in
sustaining a first degree murder conviction, observed that although
one of the people's psychiatrists testified that the defendant's moral
judgment had never developed, and that he was under an "inability
to control his impulses," 23 he knew it was against the law to kill
a human being. This knowledge alone was sufficient to deprive him
of the defense of criminal insanity.
The Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law
and Criminal Code, continuing the work of the Harriman com-
mittees, attempted to foster bills which would aid defendants who
commit criminal acts impulsively, due to mental disease, although
they have knowledge of the wrongfulness of these acts. The bill,
designed to remedy the defects of the M'Naghten Rule, was based
upon the Model Penal Code.2 4 It provided:
27Supra note 16, at 12, 123 N.E.2d at 614.
is Id. at 21-22, 123 N.E.2d at 618-19.
19 Id. at 18, 123 N.E.2d at 617.
20 Id. at 19, 123 N.E.2d at 618.
21 Gutman, sitpra note 15, at 325-26.
22 12 N.Y.2d 69, 187 N.E.2d 116, 236 N.Y.S2d 44 (1962).
21 Id. at 75, 187 N.E.2d at 120, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
2 4 MolM PEINAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1961). The
Code provides "(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at
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1. A person may not be convicted of a crime for conduct for which
he is not responsible.
2. A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity:
(a) to know or to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct; or
(b) to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
3. The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct 2 5
By excusing a defendant who lacks substantial capacity to know or
appreciate the wrongfulness of his act, the Model Penal Code
stresses the defendant's capacity to function and to relate his knowl-
edge to his acts.26  Thus, an accused is considered legally insane
despite the fact that he is capable of verbalizing about the wrong-
fulness of his act.2 7  The drafters of the Model Penal Code made
use of the words "substantial" and "appreciate" to contrast the
new approach with the M'Naghten Rule. They refused to construe
these terms, however, believing that the sense of justice of the jury
would control.2s
The most important contribution of the Code is the recogni-
tion that it is not just or expedient to subject persons to punish-
ment if they cannot conform their behavior to the requirements of
law. It does not use the term "irresistible impulse," since this
phraseology suggests that only sudden or spontaneous acts might
be excused.29  Instead, the Code would include as legally insane
all those who have substantial knowledge of the wrongfulness of
their act, yet lack the ability to conform their conduct to law.
the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (2) As
used in this Article, the terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social
conduct."
2G Interim Report of the State of New York Temporary Commission
on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, 15, 17 (Feb. 1, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as 1963 Interim Report].
26 Comment, 26 AIANY L. REv. 305, 310-13 (1962).
27 Fourth Interim Report of the State of New York Temporary Com-
mission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, 13 (Feb. 1, 1965)
[hereinafter cited as 1965 Interim Report].
28 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comment (Tent Draft No. 4, 1955). In-
sufficient knowledge concerning psychopathic personalities who engage in
repeated criminal or anti-social conduct has produced conflicting opinions
as to the most effective legislative treatment of these persons. Recognizing
the weight of opposition that would confront any extension of the defense
of insanity to the psychopathic personality, the drafters of the Model Penal
Code added subsection 3 to minimize the controversy which they felt might
impede enactment of the Code. Allen, The Rule of the American Law
Institute Model Penal Code, 45 MARg. L. REv. 494, 504-05 (1962).
29 Allen, supra note 28, at 500-01.
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The Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law
and Criminal Code, following the guidelines of the Model Penal
Code, recommended the repeal of Section 34 of the New York
Penal Law. It provided a bill to be added to the Code of Criminal
Procedure which would permit a psychiatrist to make complete
statements concerning the mental capabilities of the defendant and
to explain and clarify his diagnosis and opinion within the frame-
work of the new law.30
By passage of these bills in conjunction with the repeal of
section 34, the Commission hoped to introduce a fundamental change
in the New York Penal Law. It expressly provided in its recom-
mendations that the word "know" be given a specific connotation
when it is applied to one who appears mentally unstable. A person
who has no concept of the consequences of his acts cannot be
deemed to possess the "knowledge" requisite for legal sanity.31
"The knowledge that should be deemed material in testing responsi-
bility is more than merely surface intellection; it is the appreciation
sane men have of what it is that they are doing and of its legal
and moral quality." 32 In addition, the Commission stated that total
impairment of the ability to know or control one's actions is not and
should not be a prerequisite for mental instability.
Even in the most extreme psychoses, there is often some residual
capacity to know or to control; and, judging after the event, the psy-
chiatric expert hardly can declare on oath at the time of the disputed
action the actor was totally bereft of knowledge or control.33
After considering the Commission's proposals, the legislature
enacted the following statute:
A person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity to know or appreciate either:
(a) The nature and consequences of such conduct; or
(b) That such conduct was wrong.34
It may be observed that the statute in its present form reflects
certain significant departures from the M'Naghten Rule as it ap-
peared in former section 1120. The addition of the words "disease
80 N.Y. CoDE Carm. Pnoc. §398-b, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965,
cl. 593, § 2 (effective July 1, 1965). "[A] psychiatrist who has examined
the defendant ... [may testify to] the capacity of the defendant to know
or appreciate the nature and consequences of such conduct, or its wrong-
fulness."
11963 Interim Report 12.
321963 Interim Report 13.
83 1963 Interim Report 14.34 N.Y. Pm. LAW § 1120, as amended, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 593(effective July 1, 1965).
[ VOL.. 40
or" preceding "defect"; the substitution of "substantial capacity to
know or appreciate" for "not to know"; the replacement of "con-
sequences" for "quality"; and the use of "conduct" in place of
"act" comprise these changes. However, it is also to be noted that
the statute, as enacted, rejects the Commission's suggested formula-
tion of section 2(b), which would have exculpated a defendant who
lacked the substantial capacity "to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law." Further, the new law fails to incorporate
the Commission's proposed subsection 3 which would have defined
mental disease or defect as excluding an "abnormality manifested
only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct."
By the addition of the words "substantial capacity to know or
appreciate," it would seem that the new statute broadens the require-
ment of mere "knowledge" imposed by the M'Naghten Rule. Thus,
the new language offers a test more psychologically valid in that a
defendant possessed of mere surface knowledge can be determined
criminally insane because of his lack of understanding of the legal
and moral import of his conduct. 35 It is evident that an accused,
although possessed of sufficient cognitive powers to be deprived of
the defense of insanity under the M'Naghten Rule, might at the
time of the act lack the substantial capacity to "know or appreciate"
its nature or consequences, or to perceive its wrongfulness.
An interesting question for analysis with respect to legislative
intent is posed by the legislators' rejection of subsection 3 as recom-
mended by the Commission. The resultant exclusion of abnormal-
ities manifested solely by the criminal or anti-social conduct of
psychopathic or sociopathic persons from the definition of "mental
disease or defect" 38 would appear to be a restatement of former
section 34, which was, significantly, repealed by the same legisla-
ture. Thus, it seems that the legislature has evinced at least a
possible willingness to extend the defense of insanity to a defendant
whose morbid propensities toward criminal behavior may constitute
the requisite "mental disease or defect" which deprives him of
substantial capacity to "know or appreciate."
It is also interesting to examine the significance of the legis-
lature's refusal to enact subsection 2(b) of the Commission's recom-
mended bill, which provided that a defendant would not be deter-
mined criminally insane if he lacked the substantial capacity to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. The effect of
this refusal would seem to exclude the possibility that an accused
can be deemed insane when driven by "irresistible impulse" to
commit criminal acts where he possesses the substantial capacity
to know or appreciate the nature and consequences or wrongfulness
of such acts.
351965 Interim Report 13. See note 28, supra.
36 See 1963 Interim Report 17.
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Conclusion
The new statute constitutes a significant improvement over the
M'Naghten Rule. The emphasis is now to be placed on the de-
fendant's "substantial capacity to know or appreciate" and not
merely upon the presence or absence of knowledge. The new law
appears to provide an appreciably broader basis for psychiatric
testimony in criminal trials, and hence, a more penetrating psycho-
logical insight into the defendant's mental stability will be per-
missible. Although the testifying psychiatrists may be expected to
differ on the specifics in their analyses, it is the jury which will
render the ultimate decision. Thus, the new statute appears to
substantially conform to the intent of the drafters of the Model
Penal Code, wbo sought to give the jury a larger role in criminal
cases where the defense of insanity is invoked.
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THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT: ITS BURDENS AND BENEFITS
Introduction
In this age of ever-expanding governmental activity, it is in-
cumbent upon the general practitioner to be acquainted in some
degree with the highly specialized field of government contracts.
By "government" contracts are meant contracts for goods or
services entered into between private parties and a governmental
agency. Although the general rules of contract law apply to both
"private" contracts and "government" contracts,' due to its superior
bargaining position, the government is able to impose conditions
which enable it, ex parte, to modify the terms and obligations of
the original agreement. This comment will deal with the govern-
ment's ability to so modify its contracts through a "changes clause,"
and with the effects of this clause upon the government and the
private contractor.
The "Changes Clause"
Present in every government contract is the so-called "changes
clause." This clause is inserted by the government, through its
agent, the government contracting officer, and enables it to unilater-
37 MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
1 See, e.g., Tenney Eng'r, Inc., ASBCA No. 7352, 1962 BCA 113471(accord and satisfaction), 1 CCH GOV'T CONT. RE'. 11 6790.185 (1965);
Tankersley Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 2363 (1956), 6 CCF 1161,938 (parol
evidence rule), 1 CCH GOVT CONT. REP. 116790.71 (1965).
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